July 14, 2026 11:09 am

NOIDA is not a financial creditor, it would constitute an operational creditor. Appeal dismissed

Bysclaw

May 28, 2022

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Sections 7 and 14 — Corporate guarantee — Effect of demerger/amalgamation of corporate debtor — NCLT admission order under S. 7 relying on six judicial precedents to reject corporate guarantor’s plea that liability stood extinguished on demerger/amalgamation — NCLAT dismissing appeal and reproducing the same precedents — On independent verification by Supreme Court, found that of the six citations, one carried a wrong citation of an existing but different judgment together with a non-existent paragraph, three were altogether non-existent citations, and two, though correctly cited, contained paragraphs not traceable to the actual reported judgments — Held, the citations relied upon by NCLT were fake, non-existent or hallucinated, apparently AI-generated, and NCLAT failed to detect the fabrication — Orders of NCLT dated 28.08.2024 and NCLAT dated 11.09.2025 set aside — Section 7 application restored to its original number for fresh disposal strictly on merits, without expression of any opinion by the Supreme Court — NCLT directed to dispose of the application expeditiously, preferably within two weeks, with parties to maintain status quo in the interregnum.

Jul 2, 2026 sclaw

Cheque Dishonour I B C

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Sections 138 & 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Part III (Personal Insolvency) — Moratorium Provisions — Criminal Proceedings vs. Civil Liability — Dishonour of cheque is a criminal offence due to specific deeming fiction in Section 138, not merely a civil wrong for debt recovery, even though it arises from a debt — Held, moratorium under IBC Part III does not stay criminal proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Letter of Intent (LoI) — Appellant’s claim that LoIs were conditional due to clauses concerning pending judicial orders and staff/employee litigation rejected — NCLT and NCLAT found appellant was aware of these issues and discussions in CoC meetings — Appellant’s arguments of conditional LoI were considered an “after-thought” and an attempt to renege from the plan.

May 31, 2026 sclaw

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State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Sections 29 & 30 — Auction sale of mortgaged property by Financial Corporation for recovery of dues — Judicial review of, scope — Borrowers persistently defaulting over eight years despite multiple opportunities, repayment schedules fixed by High Court, and statutory notices — Financial Corporation auctioning mortgaged property after affording repeated chances including a final 21-day matching offer, which borrowers ignored — Held, fairness required of a Financial Corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it; fairness is not a one-way street — Courts have no say in matters between the Corporation and its debtor except where there is (a) statutory violation, or (b) the Corporation has acted unfairly/unreasonably — Writ court/civil court does not sit as an appellate authority over commercial decisions of the Corporation — Absence of prior valuation report, by itself, held insufficient to vitiate auction where borrowers never objected to the basis of sale (BOS — balance outstanding as on date of possession/sale deed) and themselves sought to retain the property on the very same terms — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court setting aside auction sale, reversed.

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — “Knowledge that such an offence has been committed” — Meaning and scope — Held, not confined to direct/personal knowledge of commission of offence based on person’s own senses — Includes awareness founded on receipt of credible information regarding commission of offence punishable under the Act — Where such information is received directly from the victim, capable of communicating/reporting/informing, the same is deemed credible — Restrictive construction confining “knowledge” to direct, sensory knowledge would render sub-sections (5) & (6) of S. 19 and R. 4 of POCSO Rules, 2012 non-functional, and defeat the protective purpose of the Act — Person receiving report from victim not obliged to independently verify or investigate truth of allegation before reporting — Conducting a prior “verification exercise” to ascertain correctness of the child’s complaint, and reporting only if own assessment finds signs of assault, is impermissible and defeats the very purpose of the Act, since it may result in disappearance of evidence and delay —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — Section 14(1)(b) — Subletting, assignment or parting with possession — Whether involuntary transfer pursuant to statutory scheme of bank amalgamation attracts the provision — Original tenant-bank (HCB) amalgamated with another bank (PNB) pursuant to a Scheme framed by RBI and notified by the Central Government under S. 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Consequent thereto, HCB ceased to exist and all its rights, including tenancy rights in the demised premises, vested in PNB, which came into possession without the landlord’s written consent — Held, S. 14(1)(b) is of wide amplitude, covering subletting, assignment, and “any other mode” by which possession is parted with, and does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transfers — Once the twin ingredients — transfer of tenancy rights/possession, and absence of the landlord’s written consent — are satisfied, the provision is attracted irrespective of the reasons necessitating the transfer — Contention that a statutory amalgamation stands outside the mischief of the provision, rejected

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 48 — Proof of custom — Essential attributes and standard of proof — Custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, and continuous, and proved by clear and cogent evidence of long and uniform usage, ordinarily through testimony of persons familiar with its practice — Onus lies on the party asserting the custom — A custom cannot be held established on the solitary, unsupported testimony of one witness, particularly where such testimony is confined to the facts of the case rather than a general and consistent practice — Held, on facts, while the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law’s property stood proved, the specific claim that an uncle-in-law could similarly adopt a ghardamad was not established, being unsupported by consistent evidence —

Jul 12, 2026 sclaw