November 18, 2024 3:23 am

Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 – Section – 6(1)(f) – Claim for exemption

Bysclaw

Jul 27, 2017

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Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 91 and 102 — The appellant had an outstanding loan from a society (R) that was wound up — The Liquidator auctioned the society’s property to recover dues, but the appellant, despite objecting to the valuation and process, did not challenge it promptly — The property was sold to respondent no. 6 for Rs. 2,51,48,000/- — The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition — The Supreme Court found procedural irregularities but held the appellant’s delay in challenging them estopped any further action. Considering the outstanding dues and undervaluation, the Court invoked Article 142 to direct respondent no. 6 to pay the appellant Rs. 1,05,98,710/- as full and final settlement. The remaining balance was to be disbursed to other creditors.

Oct 2, 2024 sclaw

Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 — Section 23 — Punjab Rural Development Act, 1987 — Section 5 — Exemption from Market fees — Market fees and Rural Development fees are distinct fees levied under two different statutes with different objects and purposes — The court further clarified that the exemption from Market fees under the 2003 Industrial Policy does not automatically extend to Rural Development fees — The court set aside the orders of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and dismissed the writ petition exemption from payment of Rural Development fees.

Jul 16, 2024 sclaw

“Jalkar vs. Private Ownership: Supreme Court Settles Dispute Over Pond Land in Bihar” Bihar Consolidation of Upholdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 – Section 37 – Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts – The dispute involves 0.32 decimal of land in Bihar, originally settled by ex-landlord ‘R’ to ‘M’, and then allegedly inherited by the plaintiff-appellant through adoption – The main issue is the possession and confirmation of the plaintiff’s possession over the land, which was challenged by the State authorities claiming the land as state-owned pond land (jalkar) – The plaintiff-appellant claims continuous possession since the land was settled to ‘M’ and asserts that the Consolidation Officer’s order confirming his title should be respected – The State of Bihar contends that the land is pond land and cannot be settled to the plaintiff-appellant, and that the civil suit is not maintainable due to the bar under Section 37 of the Consolidation Act – The Supreme Court set aside the appellate courts’ judgments, restored the trial court’s decree, and confirmed the plaintiff-appellant’s title and possession of the land – The Court found that the appellate courts erred in ignoring the final and conclusive order of the Consolidation Officer, which recognized the plaintiff-appellant’s rights – The Court reasoned that the Consolidation Officer’s order, which became final, should have been given effect to, and the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is impliedly excluded in such matters – The Supreme Court concluded that the civil suit for declaration of rights over the land is not barred by Section 37 of the Consolidation Act, and the plaintiff-appellant’s rights stand recognized by the consolidation authorities.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw