Supreme Court of India Judgements

46660 Judgements hosted as on 19/11/2024 - Search (FREE), Subscribe, Read & Download

Category: POSCO

POSCO

(IPC) – S 302, 376A, 376(2)(i), 376(2)(m), 363 and 366 – POCSO – S 6 – Accused had not consciously caused any injury with an intent to extinguish the life of the victim, and that the offence in that case was under Clause Fourthly of Section 300 IPC, this Court had commuted the sentence of death penalty to the life imprisonment – Case could not be said to be the “rarest of rare case” – the sentence of imprisonment for a period of twenty years instead of imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life for the offence under section 376A, IPC.

Apr 21, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH MOHD. FIROZ — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi,…

POSCO

Is the Special Court debarred from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 23 of POCSO and obliged to discharge the accused under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., only because of want of permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate to the police, to investigate into the offence? – Matter to be heard by appropriate bench.

Mar 29, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH GANGADHAR NARAYAN NAYAK @ GANGADHAR HIREGUTTI — Appellant Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHER — Respondent ( Before : Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari,…

POSCO

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 354(3) – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376, 302 and 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 5 and 6 – Rape and Murder of a seven-year-old girl – Death Sentence – unblemished jail conduct and having a family of wife, children and aged father would also indicate towards the probability of his reformation – It would be just and proper to award the punishment of imprisonment for life to the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC while providing for actual imprisonment for a minimum period of 30 years –

Feb 20, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH PAPPU — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH — Respondent ( Before : A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ. ) Criminal…

POSCO

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(i) – Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Sections 5 and 6 – Penetrative sexual assault on a girl child aged four years -It is a case where trust has been betrayed and social values are impaired – Therefore, the accused as such does not deserve any sympathy and/or any leniency

Feb 20, 2022 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NAWABUDDIN — Appellant Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND — Respondent ( Before : M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ. ) Criminal Appeal No. 144 of…

POSCO

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 7 – Sexual assault – Skin-to-skin contact not essential for POCSO offence – Most important ingredient for constituting the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act is the “sexual intent” and not the “skin to skin” contact with the child HELD the judgment and order of the High Court insofar as it has set aside the conviction of the accused for the offences under Section 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act is liable to be set aside, and the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Special Court is required to be restored.

Nov 21, 2021 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH  ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. SATISH AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit and Bela M. Trivedi,…

POSCO

POSCO – -Victim aged 15 years at the time of deposition is matured – Even there can be a conviction based on the sole testimony of the victim, however, she must be found to be reliable and trustworthy – Sole testimony of the victim is absolutely trustworthy and unblemished and her evidence is of sterling quality

Oct 18, 2020 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH GANESAN — Appellant Vs. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS INSPECTOR OF POLICE — Respondent ( Before : Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah,…

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Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 376 and 313 — Rape — False promise of marriage — Physical relationship with the complainant under the false promise of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent abortions — Whether the FIR should be quashed based on the allegations and the delay in filing the complaint — The petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in filing the FIR undermines the credibility of the allegations — The respondent claimed that the petitioner deceived her with a false promise of marriage, leading to non-consensual physical relations — The Supreme Court quashed the FIR, noting the long-term consensual relationship and the lack of prima facie evidence for rape under Section 376 IPC —The Court emphasized the delay in filing the FIR and the nature of the relationship, which appeared consensual —The Court referred to previous judgments, highlighting the importance of prima facie evidence and the misuse of legal provisions —The FIR and all proceedings based on it were quashed, preventing abuse of the legal process.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw
Acquittal

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B —Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) — Financial misconduct and conspiracy — Whether the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent from the charges of conspiracy and financial misconduct — The CBI argued that the High Court conducted a mini-trial at the charge-framing stage and that there was sufficient suspicion to frame charges against the respondent — The respondent’s counsel argued that the material in the charge sheet did not make out a case against the respondent and that the High Court rightly discharged him —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent, stating that mere suspicion was not enough to frame charges – The Court found that the respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum prepared by senior officers and participating in the Management Committee meeting, which approved the proposal — The Court emphasized that the proposal had passed through various committees and that the respondent’s actions did not amount to criminal misconduct — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged from the charges — The trial against other accused persons will continue.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw
Municipal Laws

Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 — Sections 146, 423 and 488(1) — The Patna Municipal Corporation imposed a royalty on advertisements, which was later increased — The respondents challenged this imposition, arguing it was a tax without legislative backing — Whether the royalty imposed by the Corporation was a tax and if it was legally enforceable without legislative sanction — The Corporation argued that the royalty was agreed upon by the parties and was not a tax — They contended that the enhancement of the rate was within their rights — The respondents argued that the imposition was a tax, which required legislative sanction, and the Corporation had no authority to levy it — The Division Bench quashed the enhancement, ruling that the Corporation had no power to impose the tax without legislative backing — The Court found that the royalty was not a tax but a fee agreed upon by the parties — It held that the Corporation’s actions were within the scope of the agreement — The Court distinguished between royalty and tax, emphasizing that royalty is based on an agreement, not statutory provision — The Court upheld the imposition of royalty as per the agreement but noted that the enhancement in rates was not challenged effectively — The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw
Constitution

Citizenship Act, 1955 — Section 6A — Special provisions as to citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord — The case involves the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955, which grants citizenship to certain migrants from Bangladesh to Assam —The main issues include whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact Section 6A, and if Section 6A violates Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution — Petitioners argue that Section 6A is unconstitutional as it conflicts with Articles 6 and 7, adopts unreasonable cut-off dates, and violates Articles 14, 29, and 355 — Respondents contend that Section 6A is within Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 11 and does not violate the Constitution — The judgment addresses the legislative competence of Parliament, the reasonableness of cut-off dates, and the impact on Assamese cultural identity — The court examines the historical context of citizenship provisions, the legislative intent behind Section 6A, and the scope of judicial review under Article 14 — The court analyzes the constitutional provisions on citizenship, the legislative objective of Section 6A, and the balance between legislative intent and constitutional mandates —The court concludes that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act is constitutional and does not violate the cited Articles of the Constitution.

Oct 21, 2024 sclaw