Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Matrimonial

Matrimonial

V IMP :: Supreme Court recently dissolved a marriage by exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, even as it recognised that there is no statutory law for recognising irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce in India.- HELD “on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, if this is not a fit case to grant divorce, what would be a fit case!”

Dec 18, 2019 sclaw

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage: “Nothing remains in this marriage”, Supreme Court invokes Article 142 to grant divorce Rintu Mariam Biju December 18 2019 The Supreme Court recently dissolved a marriage by exercising its inherent powers…

Matrimonial

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 – Section 9 – Guardianship and custody – Jurisdiction – Court where the child ‘ordinarily resides’ would have jurisdiction to decide the issues of guardianship and custody.As a consequence, the courts in Delhi would have no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition u/S. 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

Dec 12, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH JASMEET KAUR — Appellant Vs. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ. )…

Matrimonial

V IMP : Inherent Powers Under Article 142 Can Be Invoked To Dissolve Marriage Which Has Broken Down Irretrievably. HELD:” in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India the marriage cannot be dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance: SC

Oct 6, 2019 sclaw

Inherent Powers Under Article 142 Can Be Invoked To Dissolve Marriage Which Has Broken Down Irretrievably: SC HELD: ” in   exercise   of   powers   under   Article…

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I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw