Category: Income Tax Act

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Sections 37(1), 44C — Deduction of Head Office Expenditure in case of Non-Residents — Interpretation of Section 44C and ‘Head Office Expenditure’ — Distinction between ‘Common’ and ‘Exclusive’ Expenditure — Section 44C, being a special provision with a non-obstante clause, governs the quantum of allowable deduction for any expenditure incurred by a non-resident assessee that qualifies as ‘head office expenditure’ — The definition of ‘head office expenditure’ in the Explanation to Section 44C does not distinguish between common expenditure (shared among branches) and exclusive expenditure (incurred solely for Indian branches) — The term ‘attributable to’ in Section 44C(c) is broad enough to include both common and exclusive head office expenditure; exclusivity is a form of strong attribution — Therefore, Section 44C applies to head office expenditure regardless of whether it is common or exclusive, subjecting the deduction to the statutory ceiling. (Paras 2, 26, 43-45, 47-49, 59-63, 71, 86, 88)

2025 INSC 1431 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX (IT)-I, MUMBAI. Vs. M/S. AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK LTD. ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and K.V.Viswanathan, JJ. )…

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 36(1)(viii) — Interpretation of “derived from” vs. “attributable to” — The phrase “derived from” connotes a requirement of a direct, first-degree nexus between the income and the specified business activity (providing long-term finance) — It is judicially settled that “derived from” is narrower than “attributable to,” thus excluding ancillary, incidental, or second-degree sources of income — If income is even a “step removed” from the core business, the nexus is broken (Paras 14, 15, 20, 33).

2025 INSC 1414 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ( Before : Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.…

. Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 37(1) and Section 71 — Business Expenditure — Carrying on Business — A temporary lull in business or failure to secure a new contract does not amount to cessation of business if the assessee’s conduct evinces an intention to continue business, such as through continuous correspondence and bidding for new contracts.

2025 INSC 1247 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH PRIDE FORAMER S.A. @ HASH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANOTHER ( Before : Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. )…

DTAA, India-UAE, Article 5(1) — Permanent Establishment — Definition of “fixed place of business” — The definition of Permanent Establishment requires a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. The key test is whether the place is “at the disposal” of the enterprise, meaning the enterprise has the right to use the premises to carry on its business. Factors like stability, productivity, and a degree of independence are also considered.

2025 INSC 891 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH HYATT INTERNATIONAL SOUTHWEST ASIA LTD. Vs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX ( Before : J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. )…

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 17(2)(viii) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 3(7)(i) – The appeals involve challenges to the vires of Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income Tax Act and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, concerning the taxation of perquisites in the form of interest-free/concessional loans to bank employees – The primary issues are whether these provisions result in excessive delegation of legislative function to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and if Rule 3(7)(i) is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by using the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate as a benchmark – The Court reasoned that the legislative policy and standards are sufficiently clear in the primary legislation, and the rule-making authority’s actions fall within the permissible parameters of delegation – The Court found that the provisions align with the common understanding of ‘perquisites’ and ‘fringe benefits’ and that the use of SBI’s rate promotes tax efficiency and certainty – The Supreme Court concluded that Section 17(2)(viii) and Rule 3(7)(i) are intra vires and do not lead to excessive delegation or violate constitutional principles – The judgment emphasizes the importance of clarity, consistency, and fairness in tax legislation.

2024 INSC 389 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ALL INDIA BANK OFFICERS’ CONFEDERATION — Appellant Vs. THE REGIONAL MANAGER, CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, AND OTHERS ( Before : Sanjiv…

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 32(1) – Income Tax Rules, 1962 – Rule 5(1A) – There is no requirement under the second proviso to sub-rule (1A) of Rule 5 of the Rules that any particular mode of computing the claim of depreciation has to be opted for before the due date of filing of the return

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX — Appellant Vs. M/S JINDAL STEEL AND POWER LIMITED THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR — Respondent ( Before : B. V.…

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 80HHC – Claim for deduction -The assessee’s attempt to broaden the deduction sources is considered impermissible, as strict interpretation aligns with specific terms in Section 80HHC – Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 80HHC emphasize that deductions are intended exclusively for profits derived from exporting goods and merchandise outside India, and including other income contradicts the section’s intended scope and purpose – Appeal Dismissed

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH SHAH ORIGINALS — Appellant Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-24, MUMBAI — Respondent ( Before : B.V. Nagarathna and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ. ) Civil Appeal…

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – A notification under Section 90(1) is necessary and a mandatory condition for a court, authority, or tribunal to give effect to a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), or any protocol changing its terms or conditions, which has the effect of altering the existing provisions of law – The interpretation of the expression “is” has present signification. Therefore, for a party to claim benefit of a “same treatment” clause, based on entry of DTAA between India and another state which is member of OECD, the relevant date is entering into treaty with India, and not a later date, when, after entering into DTAA with India, such country becomes an OECD member, in terms of India’s practice.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH ASSESSING OFFICER CIRCLE (INTERNATIONAL TAXATION) 2(2)(2) NEW DELHI — Appellant Vs. M/S NESTLE SA — Respondent ( Before : S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar…

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