Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Category: Cheque Dishonour

Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 139 – Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability

Feb 14, 2020 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH APS FOREX SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED — Appellant Vs. SHAKTI INTERNATIONAL FASHION LINKERS AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Ashok Bhushan and M. R.…

Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Suspension of sentence: Section 148 Has Retrospective Application, But 143A Is Prospective HELD non-compliance of the condition can very well hold that the suspension of sentence stands vacated due to non-compliance

Jan 8, 2020 sclaw

NI Act: Section 148 Has Retrospective Application, But 143A Is Prospective, Reiterates SC [Read Judgment] Ashok Kini 8 Jan 2020 4:57 PM The Supreme Court has reiterated that Section 148…

Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Sections 118(a) and 138 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 313 – Dishonour of cheque – Appeal against acquittal – it is presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e., the appellant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, thereafter, shifts on the accused-appellant to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption, which onus has not been discharged by the respondent.

Oct 19, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UTTAM RAM — Appellant Vs. DEVINDER SINGH HUDAN AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ. ) Criminal…

Cheque Dishonour

“The oral and the documentary evidence adduced by the complainant are sufficient to prove that it was a legally enforceable debt and that the cheques were issued to discharge the legally enforceable debt. With the evidence adduced by the complainant, the courts below ought to have raised the presumption under Section 139 of the Act

Aug 21, 2019 sclaw

The Supreme Court on Wednesday made pertinent observations regarding the burden of proof that falls upon opposing parties in a cheque bouncing dispute under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A Bench…

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I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw