May 19, 2024 12:12 am

A. Education Law – The case involves a service rule amendment by the State of Madhya Pradesh, impacting job aspirants – The amendment was later recalled, but not before affecting an ongoing recruitment process – The main issue was the application of the amended rule to the recruitment process, leading to legal challenges and the question of whether meritorious reservation category candidates should be treated as unreserved at the preliminary examination stage – The petitioners challenged the validity of the amended rule and its application to the recruitment process, arguing it caused injustice to candidates who had already cleared the main examination – The State and MPPSC defended the amended rule’s application and the subsequent recruitment process, including the normalization method used for merging examination results – The Court dismissed the civil appeal, finding no merit in the challenge against the High Court’s judgment, which had directed a special main examination for newly eligible candidates – The Court agreed with the High Court’s reasoning that holding a special main examination was justified and that the normalization process was consistent with legal requirements – The Court referred to precedents affirming that meritorious reservation category candidates are entitled to be selected in the open category without counting against the reserved quota – The Supreme Court concluded that the normalization process was transparent and fair, and upheld the High Court’s judgment directing the completion of the recruitment process as per the unamended rules. B. Madhya Pradesh State Service Examination Rules, 2015 – Rule 4 of 2015 Rules was amended by the State of Madhya Pradesh – The Supreme Court of India dismissed a civil appeal challenging the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission’s (MPPSC) decision to normalize the marks of candidates who appeared in two different main examinations – The court found that the process of normalization and the consequent merger of marks secured by the candidates in the two main examinations was transparent and above board – The court also noted that the earlier amendment to the rules, which harmed the interests of reservation category candidates, was restored, enabling the drawing up of the result of the preliminary examination by segregating deserving meritorious reservation category candidates with meritorious unreserved category candidates – The court concluded that the impugned judgment did not brook interference on any ground, be it on facts or in law.

Bysclaw

May 5, 2024

Service Matters

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Constitution Service

Judicial Services – Judicial Appointment – Minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce test for appointment to the District Judiciary in the States of Bihar and Gujarat – The petitioners argue that the prescription of minimum qualifying marks for viva voce is arbitrary and unreasonable and violates their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution – The respondents argue that the selection process is legally valid and in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations – The court concludes that the prescription of minimum qualifying marks for viva voce is permissible and is not in violation of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others – The court also finds that the impugned selection process in the State of Bihar and Gujarat is legally valid and is upheld – The court further concludes that the non-consultation with the Public Service Commission would not render the Gujarat Rules, 2005 (as amended in 2011) void – The writ petitions are dismissed without any order on cost.

May 11, 2024 sclaw

Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Sections 70(2) and 95(1) – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Samvida Shala Shikshak(Employment and Conditions of Contract) Rules, 2005 – Rule 7A – Appointment – Denial of – Appellant was denied appointment as Samvida Shala Shikshak Grade-III despite passing the selection exam and the High Court’s ruling in her favor – The main issue was the State Government’s refusal to appoint the appellant based on amended rules, which were applied retrospectively – The appellant argued that the denial of appointment was illegal and arbitrary, and that she fulfilled all qualifications for the post – The State contended that the appellant was not eligible for appointment due to the retrospective application of Rule 7-A – The Supreme Court directed the appellant’s appointment to an equivalent post, without back wages but with compensation for the arbitrary denial of her rightful claim – The Court found the State’s actions to be mala fide and arbitrary, as they denied the appellant’s legitimate claim despite multiple court orders – Referencing the case of Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, the Court emphasized the duty to provide restitution for arbitrary actions – The Court allowed the appeals, ordered the appellant’s appointment, and granted compensation, highlighting the need for restitutive relief.

May 5, 2024 sclaw

Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (House Rent Allowance and City Compensation Allowance) Rules, 1992 – Rule 6(h) – House Rent Allowance (HRA) – The appellant, a retired Inspector(Telecom) in Jammu and Kashmir Police, was charged with unauthorized House Rent Allowance (HRA) drawals and asked to repay Rs.3,96,814/-.- The main issue was whether the appellant was entitled to HRA while sharing government accommodation allotted to his retired father – The appellant argued that the quarter was allotted to his father, a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police, and he only occasionally shared it, thus he should not be charged HRA – The State contended that the appellant was not entitled to HRA as per Rule 6(h)(i) and (ii) because he shared rent-free accommodation allotted to his father – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision and the recovery notice – The Court found no application for Rule 6(h)(iv) in the appellant’s case and held that clauses 6(h)(i) and (ii) covered the controversy – The Court reasoned that since the appellant shared accommodation with a retired government servant, he was not entitled to claim HRA – The appeal is dismissed as devoid of force, and the recovery notice was justified in the eyes of the law

May 5, 2024 sclaw

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Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw