Supreme Court of India Judgements

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Month: September 2019

Rent

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 227 – Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – Sections 15(1) and 15(7) – Payment of rent Amount of rent payable for the demised premises may be a factor which cannot be brushed aside, but the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, do not suggest any negligence, defiance or contumacious non ­payment of the amount payable to the landlord to warrant the taking of that “exceptional step” which is bound to render the tenant defenceless in his contest against the respondents­landlord.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH DINA NATH (D ) BY LRS AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. SUBHASH CHAND SAINI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : Arun Mishra, M.R.…

Cr P C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 102 – Power of police officer to seize certain property – ‘any property’ used in sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not include immovable property. The power of seizure in Section 102 has to be limited to movable property – The phrase ‘any property’ in Section 102 will only cover moveable property and not immovable property.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH NEVADA PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS DIRECTORS — Appellant Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : Ranjan Gogoi, CJI., Deepak…

Service Matters
Service

Once, the respondent chose not to controvert the allegations made against him in the show cause notice and pursued the matter with the competent authority only for taking a lenient view, he cannot be permitted to resile from that position. It would result in allowing the respondent to approbate and reprobate.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA DIVISION BENCH UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS — Appellant Vs. LT. COL. KULDEEP YADAV — Respondent ( Before : A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ. )…

Limitation

Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 433, 434, 433(e) and 434(1)(c) – Winding up Petition – Trigger of limitation – A winding up proceeding is a proceeding ‘in rem’ and not a recovery proceeding, the trigger of limitation, so far as the winding up petition is concerned, would be the date of default.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH JIGNESH SHAH AND ANOTHER — Appellant Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : R.F. Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and Surya…

Constitution

It is settled law that the fundamental right under Article 30 cannot be waived.If school is a minority institution, Rule 28 of the Rules for Management of Recognized Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) 1969, cannot possibly apply as there would be a serious infraction of the right of school to administer the institution with teachers of its choice.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH CHANDANA DAS (MALAKAR) — Appellant Vs. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : R.F. Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and…

Will & Succession

Wakfs Act, 1954 – Section 56 – Waqfs Act, 1995 – Sections 63 and 83(9) – Succession Act, 1925 – Section 25 – Appointment of mutawalli . The High Court’s finding that the waqif intended that the mutawalli-ship should devolve upon Kammu Mia’s descendants only after the waqif’s direct lineal descendants are exhausted is patently incorrect in as much as the waqf deed does not contain any such stipulation.

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH MD. ABRAR — Appellant Vs. MEGHALAYA BOARD OF WAKF AND ANOTHER — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Ajay Rastogi,…

C P C

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 22 – Mutawalliship – The word “putro” means son and grandson. In reading and interpreting the term “putro poutradi krome”, the meaning of the individual words must also be considered and accounted for. A combined reading of these terms lends support to the view that “putro poutradi krome” means son and grandson, generation after generation, and therefore does not include any female descendants

Sep 29, 2019 sclaw

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA FULL BENCH  SYEDA NAZIRA KHATOON (D) BY LR. — Appellant Vs. SYED ZAHIRUDDIN AHMED BAGHDADI AND OTHERS — Respondent ( Before : N.V. Ramana, Mohan M.…

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I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw