Supreme Court of India Judgements

46468 Judgements hosted as on 12/05/2024 - Search (FREE), Subscribe, Read & Download

Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Condonation of Delay – Delay of 1663 days – The State of U.P. filed a SLP against an order dated 13.11.2009 by the Allahabad High Court, with a delay of 1,633 days – The main issue was the condonation of the significant delay in filing the SLP – The State argued that the delay was due to the time taken for obtaining legal opinion and permissions, and later, the realization that the appeal was not filed initially – The application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and consequently, the SLP was also dismissed – The court found the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory, especially since the State was aware of the High Court’s order when it was passed – The court did not find sufficient cause to condone the delay, leading to the dismissal of the SLP.

Bysclaw

May 5, 2024

2024 INSC 375

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DIVISION BENCH

STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER — Appellant

Vs.

MOHAN LAL — Respondent

( Before : C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ. )

Special Leave Petition (C) No.25032 of 2014

Decided on : 03-05-2024

“Legal Opinion Not Enough: Supreme Court Dismisses State Appeal Due to Unexplained Delay”

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Condonation of Delay – Delay of 1663 days – The State of U.P. filed a SLP against an order dated 13.11.2009 by the Allahabad High Court, with a delay of 1,633 days – The main issue was the condonation of the significant delay in filing the SLP – The State argued that the delay was due to the time taken for obtaining legal opinion and permissions, and later, the realization that the appeal was not filed initially – The application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and consequently, the SLP was also dismissed – The court found the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory, especially since the State was aware of the High Court’s order when it was passed – The court did not find sufficient cause to condone the delay, leading to the dismissal of the SLP.

The precedent set by the Supreme Court of India in this case is that:

1. A petitioner seeking condonation of delay in filing a special leave petition must provide a sufficient cause for the delay. Merely stating that the matter was entrusted to counsel or that the case was not properly followed up at any stage is not considered a sufficient cause.

2. Misleading or incorrect statements in the petition regarding related cases or their status can negatively impact the court’s decision on the condonation of delay.

3. The court will not condone a significant delay in filing a special leave petition if the petitioner had the opportunity to challenge the order earlier and failed to do so without a valid reason.

ORDER

Rajesh Bindal, J. – The present petition has been filed impugning order[1] passed by the Division Bench of the High Court[2]. Along with the petition, an application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 1,633 days in filing the present petition.

[1] Dated 13.11.2009 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.34974 of 2001

[2] High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

2. A perusal of the application filed by the petitioner-State seeking condonation of huge delay of 1,633 days in filing the petition shows that to challenge the impugned order dated 13.11.2009 passed by the High Court the file was put up before the Competent Authority, Bareilly, for the first time on 13.04.2011. On this file the Competent Authority directed to seek legal opinion from the District Government Counsel (Civil)[3]. After receiving the legal opinion from DGC (Civil), permission was sought from the State Government which was granted and received by the petitioner on 16.09.2011. Thereafter, to explain the delay in filing the petition, the only plea taken is that the matter was entrusted to the counsel. However, later it was found that initially the appeal was not filed. It is further evident from the application that the case was not properly followed up at any stage. The explanation given for seeking condonation of huge delay of 1,633 days cannot be accepted, when it is not disputed that the petitioner-State appeared before the High Court and was heard before passing of the impugned order, so it was within their knowledge.

[3] Hereinafter referred to as DGC (Civil)

2.1 Another fact which may be noticed is that the petitioner-State at page K of the Synopsis and List of Dates has referred to Special Leave Petition (Civil).. ..CC.. ..No.21120 of 2013 titled as State of U.P. & others v. Vinod Kumar Tripathi & others stating therein that in the aforesaid petition identical issue was involved and this Court after condoning the delay had issued notice and the matter is still pending. The actual cause title of the Special Leave Petition (Civil).. ..CC.. ..No.21120 of 2013 is State of U.P. and others v. Sanjay Kumar and another. However, from a bare perusal of the order dated 13.12.2013 passed in the aforesaid petition annexed with this petition as Annexure P-7, it is evident that the aforesaid petition was dismissed on account of delay and on merits. Hence the statement was wrong and misleading.

2.2 Further, the petitioner-State in this petition has mentioned in its ground that in an identical case involving the same question of law, the petitioner-State had preferred S.L.P.(C).CC.No.21595 of 2013 titled as State of U.P. & Anr. vs Vinod Kumar Tripathi & Ors. in which this Court had issued notice, and the matter is still pending adjudication before this Court. However, the same has also been dismissed by this Court vide order dated 19.01.2016.

3. From the material placed on record, we do not find sufficient cause is made out for condonation of huge delay of 1,633 days in filing the present petition.

4. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. The Special Leave Petition is also dismissed.

By sclaw

Related Post

Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order 9 Rule 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 –The Court found no satisfactory explanation for the delay, noting the appellant’s negligence and inconsistency in statements – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the orders of the lower courts and refusing to condone the inordinate delay.

Apr 13, 2024 sclaw

Leave a Reply

You missed

I P C

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) – Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998 – Section 4 – Gang Rape – The victim’s testimony, along with her mother and aunt’s statements, was consistent with the initial complaint and corroborated by medical evidence – The defense argued that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – Whether the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies were not significant and did not affect the overall credibility of the evidence – The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The court rejected the defense’s argument that the long gap between the victim’s examination-in-chief and cross-examination led to inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies – The court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant for gang rape and related charges – The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant and rejected the defence’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Dismissal of Civil Suit – Condonation of delay – Standing to file an application – The court clarified that only parties to a suit or those who have accrued a right in the lis can file an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of the suit. A stranger to the proceedings cannot file such an application.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963 – Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 – Section 3(1)(b) – State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – Section 29 – The appeals arise from a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of time-barred debts under the Act, 1979, and the Act, 1951 – The main issue is whether a debt time-barred under the Limitation Act can be recovered using the aforementioned Acts – The appellants argued that time-barred debts cannot be recovered under the Recovery of Dues Act, citing the precedent set in V.R. Kalliyanikutty – The respondents argued that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act allow for time-barred debt recovery, as they only bar the remedy, not the right – The court examined whether the Recovery of Dues Act creates a new right for creditors and allows for time-barred debt recovery – The court discussed the distinction between a debt and the right of action for its recovery, noting that the statute of limitation bars the latter but not the former – The court concluded that the Recovery of Dues Act and the State Financial Corporations Act provide an alternative mechanism for recovering debts, even if they are time-barred – Matter needs to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench.

May 12, 2024 sclaw
Consumer

Consumer Law – Policy Claim – The appellants, family of the deceased, filed a complaint after the LIC repudiated their claim on a policy following the policyholder’s accidental death – The main issue was whether there was a concluded contract between the deceased and LIC at the time of his death, which would obligate LIC to pay the insurance benefits – The appellants argued that LIC had accepted the first premium and issued a receipt, thereby assuming risk and concluding the contract before the policyholder’s death – LIC contended that the policy was not communicated to the deceased and was blocked due to his demise, implying no concluded contract existed – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s order, restored the District Forum’s order in favor of the appellants, and directed LIC to pay the insurance benefits as per the policy terms – The Court found clear presumption of acceptance of the policy by LIC, as the first premium receipt indicated the corporation was on risk from the receipt date – The Court relied on precedents that establish the principles of insurance contracts and the obligations of good faith expected from insurers – The Supreme Court concluded that LIC had indeed entered into a contract with the policyholder before his death, and thus, was liable to pay the insurance benefits to the appellants.

May 12, 2024 sclaw