December 19, 2024 4:27 pm

Cheque Dishonour

Dishonour of Cheque—Friendly Loan—When financial capacity of complainant to lend the amount is being questioned, it was necessary for the complainant to have explained his financial capacity—Complainant failed to prove his financial capacity to lend--A ccused acquitted.

Dishonour of Cheque—Rebuttable Presumption–Onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence—The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

Dishonour of Cheque—Rebuttable Presumption—Inference of *preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely***

Bysclaw

May 25, 2019

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By sclaw

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Banking Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 143A — Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 143A of the Act 1881 — The High Court had held that an authorized signatory of a company is not a “drawer” of a cheque within the meaning of Section 143A of the NI Act —The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the NI Act and the legal precedents on the subject, and concluded that the primary liability for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act lies with the company itself, and the company’s management is only subsequently and vicariously liable — Therefore, it is only the company that is to be considered as the “drawer” of the cheque.

Aug 18, 2024 sclaw

Cheque Dishonour

Burden of Proof in Section 138 N.I. Act Cases — The court reaffirmed that once the issuance of a cheque and its dishonor for insufficiency of funds are established, a presumption arises under Sections 138, 139, and 118(a) of the N.I. Act that the amount mentioned in the cheque was legally due and payable by the drawer to the payee — The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption by producing satisfactory evidence.

Aug 18, 2024 sclaw

Acquittal Cheque Dishonour

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 — The appellant lent Rs. 2,00,000 to the respondent, who issued a cheque as a guarantee — The cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds — Whether the respondent committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act, 1881 and Section 420 of the IPC — The appellant argued that the respondent failed to repay the loan and intentionally cheated him — The respondent claimed the cheque was issued for security purposes to a third party and denied the loan transaction — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s judgment that favored the respondent’s acquittal — The court found contradictions in the appellant’s statements and lack of evidence regarding the loan transaction — The court emphasized the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881, and the burden on the respondent to rebut it — The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent’s acquittal was upheld.

Aug 11, 2024 sclaw

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Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

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Dec 8, 2024 sclaw

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 364, 302 and 201 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of murder charges as the prosecution failed to prove the crucial link of the accused’s disclosure leading to the discovery of skeletal remains under Section 27 and the DNA evidence was also found to be inconclusive due to lack of proper collection of samples. – Proof of Disclosure Statements under Section 27 — Voluntariness and Uninfluenced Nature — The Court reiterates that the information provided by an accused under Section 27 must be voluntary and uninfluenced by threat, duress, or coercion.

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Dec 8, 2024 sclaw